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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Motivation 
Multi-user wireless communications systems form competitive environments, where 
heterogeneous and strategic users compete for the available spectrum resources. These 
heterogeneous devices may differ in terms of their adopted standards and architectures, their 
deployed communication algorithms, their experienced environment (e.g. channel conditions and 
traffic characteristics), their application-defined utilities etc. [1]. Moreover, these devices can also 
significantly differ in their ability to sense the environment and acquire information about other 
users sharing the same spectrum, exchange information and negotiate spectrum access rules with 
the competing users and, ultimately, learn and reason based on the available information to select 
their optimal transmission strategies. Importantly, in most communication scenarios, users compete 
for resources in a strategic manner, i.e. they aim at maximizing their own utilities.  
The majority of past multi-user communications research has focused on analyzing and 
quantifying the performance of various multi-user environments, where transceivers with similar 
standards, algorithms or utilities share the available spectrum resources. An underlying assumption 
has been that the users select their transmission actions based on either complete or no knowledge 
about their competitors’ protocols, strategies, utility functions, environment etc. In this report, the 
term “knowledge” represents the correct beliefs 1  of users about their opponents and the 
 
1 Plato defined knowledge as "justified true belief" [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/knowledge]. 
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environment.  
Specifically, two extreme types of multi-user interaction have been especially studied in the past: 
• the complete knowledge scenario, which assumes that all participating users know2 the other 
users’ actions, utility forms etc.;  
• the private knowledge (e.g. the knowledge of its own channel or traffic characteristics) scenario, 
where users interact by assuming no knowledge about each other. 
Hence, the aforementioned communications scenarios neglect that in a multi-user communication 
system, the users’ knowledge is mostly decentralized and heterogeneous.  
Another assumption in the existing research has been that there is consensus about what is a fair 
distribution of resources and thus, efficiency and fairness can be simultaneously satisfied. However, 
this violates the strategic nature of users and, as a result, it encourages a passive participation of 
transceivers in the multi-user interaction, because wireless users are not able to proactively 
influence the resource division based on their knowledge. Thus, such current multi-user network 
designs do not consider the heterogeneity and decentralization of the knowledge of the 
participating devices and, do not take advantage of the transceivers’ “smartness” (i.e. their ability to 
acquire information, learn and reason about their opponents), which often lead in practice to 
inefficient spectrum usage. For instance, in existing centralized resource management solutions for 
802.11e Hybrid Coordination Function, users operate in a non-collaborative manner and request 
spectrum access from the moderator (e.g. the access point or base station) by declaring their worst 
case resource needs, while disregarding the resource requests of their competing users [48].  
Alternatively, in this report, we present relatively recent research developments aimed at 
building a new paradigm for multi-user communication environments, where the emerging 
interaction among users and their resulting performance will be driven by the heterogeneous users’ 
ability to strategically adapt their transmission actions, based on their knowledge about their 
 
2 The assumption is that this knowledge was obtained by users publicly announcing their private information, or by implicitly 
assuming that all users that are co-existing adopt the same protocol [7][13]. 
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competitors and the environment. Hence, voluntary rather than externally imposed (e.g. protocol 
enforced) collaborations may evolve among strategic users, because such collaborations may allow 
them to increase their own utility [44]. The development of such new paradigms for multi-user 
communications scenarios is essential, given the recent proliferation of heterogeneous protocols, 
devices, applications and services, but also diverse user needs. 
B. A user-centric approach for multi-user communications  
In this report, we will not adopt the conventional view of characterizing the multi-user 
interactions from a system designer’s perspective, which aims to maximize the social welfare of the 
users by assuming that there is common knowledge about the users’ preferences etc. and that there 
is consensus about how to define the welfare [45][46]. Instead, we will take the viewpoint of 
self-interested users, which have their own preferences and knowledge, and present a theoretical 
foundation that enables devices to proactively improve their own utilities by acquiring knowledge 
based on their strategic interaction with competing users. Note that this user-centric approach can 
also positively impact the overall communication system performance, as users are now proactively 
interacting and improving their knowledge. This decentralized knowledge paradigm is well-suited 
in the considered heterogeneous and distributed communication environments, where there is little 
or no available common knowledge.  
In the presented paradigm for multi-user wireless systems, the heterogeneous transceivers are 
modeled as self-interested agents that strategically interact by adapting their transmission actions in 
order to maximize their own payoffs. The transmission actions are the algorithms and 
configurations available in the protocols of various OSI layers (from the application to the physical 
layer). The heterogeneous users may differ not only in their available transmission actions, but also 
in their strategies for selecting their actions based on their utilities, and their available knowledge 
about other users and the environment., The emerging interaction among users and their resulting 
performance in the paradigm is driven not only by the users’ ability to efficiently adapt their 
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transmission strategies (e.g. their available modulation and coding schemes, ability to shape their 
traffic), but also by their ability to proactively acquire information and form accurate beliefs about 
their competitors and the environment. The knowledge that the users can build depends on their 
ability to acquire information (which may be restricted by their hardware constraints, adopted 
protocols, etc.) and their capability to reason and learn based on this information, in order to form 
beliefs about the other users’ actions, policies, protocols etc. Using their knowledge, the users can 
predict the responses of their opponents to their actions, and hence optimize their strategies for 
selecting a specific action given their utility. Thus, the multi-user wireless interaction becomes a 
game played by strategic agents, based on their available actions, strategies and, additionally, their 
knowledge. In short, unlike in traditional communication theory, where the performance of each 
user and the system is influenced by the users’ actions, protocols and experienced environment, in 
the communication paradigm discussed in this report, the knowledge based on which users select 
their actions will also play an essential role. 
In this report, we show how different forms of knowledge about the environment and competing 
users can influence the actions selected by various users and, consequentially, shape the resulting 
multi-user interactions and the utilities obtained by the users. We also introduce strategic learning 
techniques that enable users to accumulate knowledge and maximize their utilities by acquiring 
information via their interactions with other users and, based on this information, building their 
beliefs about their competing users and the environment, and optimizing their transmission actions.  
C. Quantifying performance in multi-user environments with decentralized knowledge 
To characterize multi-user environments with decentralized knowledge, we discuss in this report 
two related metrics:  
(a) The value of knowledge. First, we discuss which performance bounds can be attained by 
individual users, when users and/or resource moderators with different degrees of knowledge 
about the entire communication system and the competing users (e.g. the knowledge of other 
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users’ action space, strategies, utility functions, used protocols etc.) interact. We term these 
resulting performance bounds as “the value of knowledge”. We show in this report how the 
heterogeneous users can select their actions, given their available knowledge.  
(b) The value of learning. We also discuss methods for constructing operational solutions and 
algorithms, which enable each user to approach the performance bound. For this, users can 
systematically acquire information about other users and, based on this information, deploy 
strategic learning solutions that enable them to forecast the other users’ responses and, 
ultimately, to optimize their transmission actions. We highlight several strategic learning 
techniques, which require various information overheads and complexity costs, and lead to 
different performance gains for the wireless users. To quantify these gains, we use a new metric, 
which we refer to as “the value of learning”.  
 
Fig. 1. Components of heterogeneous multi-user communication framework with decentralized knowledge. 
As shown in Figure 1, while the value of learning depends on the practical capability of the user to 
reason and dynamically improve its beliefs based on its observations and explicit information 
exchanges, the value of knowledge represents the upper bound which can be achieved by a user, 
given its observations and information. The term observation refers to the observable outcome that 
users can access in the multi-user interaction without explicitly exchanging messages, while 
information is obtained by users through explicit message exchanges 
Summarizing, the goal of this report is to provide the reader with a thorough understanding of 
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how the users’ learning abilities, their knowledge, and their strategies for selecting actions will 
impact and shape the multi-user interaction and the users’ resulting utilities.  
The report is divided into two main parts. First, we will discuss how the users can optimize their 
actions based on their available knowledge and show how to compute performance bounds 
achievable by the heterogeneous users with different knowledge. Second, to approach these bounds, 
we discuss how to construct operational algorithms for wireless users to proactively drive the 
information acquisition, and use strategic learning to form beliefs, based on which they can 
optimize their transmission strategies. 
Section II describes the game theoretic approach in the communication setting and introduces a 
general mathematic model for communication games. Section III defines the value of available 
knowledge in communication games, formulates the optimal decision making for the users with 
heterogeneity in their available knowledge, and validates the performance improvement in power 
control games. In Section IV, the theory of learning in games is introduced as a tool for acquiring 
knowledge by users and improving their own performance. For instance, it is shown that in power 
control games, users can improve their performance by applying the regret matching algorithm. 
Section V concludes the report with the key challenges for future research. 
II. A GAME THEORETIC MODEL FOR COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 
Game theory provides a formal framework for studying the interactions of strategic agents. 
Recently, there has been a surge in research activities that employ game theory to model and 
analyze a wide range of application scenarios in modern communication networks [2]-[4], 
including resource allocation [5][6], power control and spectrum management [7]-[13], medium 
access control [14]-[17], routing and congestion control [18]-[22], information theoretical analysis 
[23]-[25], etc. Depending on the characteristics of different applications, numerous 
game-theoretical models and solution concepts have been proposed to describe the multi-user 
interactions and optimize the users’ decisions in communication networks.  
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Fig. 2. A general illustration of knowledge-driven communication games 
In this report, we first formulate the multi-user interaction in communication systems as a 
knowledge-driven strategic game, where users with different levels of knowledge availability 
compete for limited resources. As shown in Figure 2, the game is formally defined as a tuple 
, , , ,GameΩ = N W A U K , where { }1, ,N= "N  is the set of wireless users, which are the 
rational decision-makers in the system; W  is the available network resources, e.g. frequency bands, 
time slots, or routes; A  is the joint action space n n∈=× NA A , with nA  being the action set 
available for user n  to play the resource sharing game (e.g. selecting a specific frequency channel, 
time slot, or route for transmission); U  is the utility vector function defined as a mapping from joint 
actions and the network resources to an N -dimensional real vector with each element being the 
utility of a particular user, i.e. : Nn nu∈ += × × 6 \NU A W ; K  represents the joint knowledge set 
of all the users. Specifically, for any ( )1, , Nk k= ∈" Kk , nk  indicates user n ’s available 
knowledge about its opponents and the network resource. In a communication environment, users 
interact with each other and determine their actions such that they maximize their utility functions 
based on their available knowledge. Note that, as opposed to traditional strategic game definitions 
[26], we purposely include two new components W  and K  in the game formulation, because both 
of them play very important roles in communication games. Specifically, the available network 
resources W  over which the game is played directly influences the utility achievable by the 
participating users. The next section will investigate the impact of knowledge K  in communication 
games. The proposed game formulation is general and it can be applied in numerous 
communication scenarios. As we will see in the next section, many well-known game models are 
special cases of the above formulation.  
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III. KNOWLEDGE IN COMMUNICATION GAMES 
A. The Value of Knowledge 
( )V privk ( )V heterk
( )V compk
 
Fig. 3. The value of knowledge. 
We define the policy with which user n  engages in the multi-user game :n n nπ 6K A , as a 
mapping from the user’s available knowledge into its specific selected action. The value of 
knowledge is defined as 
( ) ( ){ }1 1( ), , ( ),N Nk k wπ π= "kV U ,               (1) 
which is the utility of individual users given their selected actions based on their knowledge3. This 
metric represents the resulting performance given the decentralized knowledge available to the 
users. However, as we will discuss later, existing research on communication games usually 
implicitly assumes that the knowledge vector k  takes two extremes: either complete knowledge 
about the entire multi-user system compk  or private knowledge privk  about themselves. By 
explicitly allowing the knowledge nk  in equation (1) to vary, i.e. individual users have different 
degrees of knowledge, we aim at providing a systematic characterization of the impact of 
knowledge availability in communication networks. Figure 3 shows an example of the value of 
heterogeneous and decentralized knowledge heterk  by comparing it with the conventional solution 
concepts, including Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum that will be defined in the next 
subsection, where users have private knowledge privk  or complete knowledge compk , respectively. 
 
3 For the remaining part of this report, we omit w  in the expression of utility functions for static network resource. 
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Intuitively, users can benefit themselves by gaining more knowledge. However, this may 
potentially harm other users [49]. As we will show later, it is surprising that there are also settings 
where it can lead to ( ) ( );V Vheter privk k 4, if  ⊇heter privk k , i.e. a subset of self-interested users 
with more knowledge may benefit the utilities of all users in the communication system. 
B. Special Cases: Private Knowledge and Complete Knowledge  
Roughly speaking, the existing multi-user research can be categorized into two types, 
non-cooperative games and cooperative games. In wireless networks, any action taken by a single 
user usually affects the utilities of the other users sharing the same resources. Various game 
theoretic solutions were developed to characterize the resulting performance in both game models, 
among which the most well-known ones include Nash equilibrium (NE) and Pareto optimality [26]. 
As we will see, both scenarios implicitly assume that the users’ available knowledge takes a 
homogeneous form. This is mainly because most research assumes that only users with 
homogeneous protocols, actions, etc. can interact. However, new systems are currently emerging, 
where heterogeneous users with different protocols and running different applications co-exist and 
influence each other.   
First, non-cooperative approaches generally assume that the participating users only have 
private knowledge privnk  about their own channel conditions, utility functions, etc. These users 
simply choose actions n na ∈ A  to selfishly maximize their individual utility functions. In other 
words, the policy of each user is ( )( ) arg max ,
n n
priv
n n n n na
k u a aπ ∈= A −  in which na− =  
( )1 1 1, , , , ,n n Na a a a− +" " . Most non-cooperative approaches are devoted to investigating the 
existence and properties of NE. NE is defined to be a profile ( )* *1 , , Na a"  of actions with the 
property that for every player, it satisfies ( ) ( )* * *, ,n n n n n nu a a u a a− −≥  for all n na ∈ A , i.e. given the 
other users’ actions, no user can increase its utility alone by changing its action. As shown in Figure 
 
4 The symbol ;  denotes component-wise inequality. 
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3, it is well-known that operating in non-cooperative manners will generally limit the performance 
of the device itself as well as the whole system, because the available resources are not always 
effectively exploited due to the conflicts of interest occurring among users [27].  
On the other hand, cooperative approaches focus on studying how users can jointly optimize a 
common objective function ( )1, , Nf u u" . This function represents the social welfare (allocation 
rule) based on which the system-wide resource allocation is performed. Allocation rules, e.g. 
weighted sum maximization, can provide reasonable allocation outcomes by considering the 
trade-off between fairness and efficiency. However, this is true only when users agree on the 
allocation rules, or they are price-takers, which disregards the decentralized knowledge of users, 
and their strategic nature.  
A profile of actions is Pareto optimal if there is no other profile of actions that makes every 
player at least as well off and at least one player strictly better off. Most cooperative approaches 
focus on studying how to efficiently find the optimum joint policy ( )* 1argmax , , N
a
a f u u
∈
= "
A
. It 
should be pointed out that, in order to achieve Pareto optimality, information exchange throughout 
the whole system is required such that all the users can collaboratively maximize ( )1, , Nf u u"  and 
improve the system efficiency. These cooperative scenarios either assume complete knowledge 
compk  about all the users by a trusted moderator or peer (e.g. access point, base station, selected 
network leader etc.), to which it is given the authority to centrally divide the available resources 
among the participating users [11], or, in the distributed setting [7][12][13], users exchange price 
signals { }1, , Np p= "p  that reflect the “cost” for consuming the constrained resources and 
maintain the required knowledge of { },n n nk u p=  to maximize the social welfare and reach Pareto 
optimal allocations. In both centralized and decentralized scenarios, the users are assumed to have 
as objectives the maximization of social welfare. However, in many practical settings, strategic 
users aim at optimizing their own utilities based on their knowledge, rather than that of the system.  
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C. An Example: Power Control Games with Decentralized and Heterogeneous 
Knowledge  
As discussed previously, existing approaches only assume two extremes for the users’ 
knowledge. However, devices in current wireless networks can differ a lot in their abilities to sense 
the environment, to gather information, to reason about this information and proactively make 
decisions, which motivates us to investigate the impact of heterogeneity (in terms of action sets, 
utilities, knowledge) in the communication system. The decentralized heterogeneous knowledge of 
devices can take various forms, e.g. knowledge about resource allocation rules, available resource, 
opponents’ actions, their strategies, and their utility functions. As an illustration, we investigate a 
multi-user power control game that considers how users should allocate their power in multi-carrier 
systems [10].  
1) Power Control Games 
 
Fig. 4. Gaussian interference channel model. 
Figure 4 shows the frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel models. There are N  
transmitters and N  receivers in the system. Each transmitter and receiver pair can be viewed as a 
player. The transfer function of the channel from transmitter i  to receiver j  is denoted as ( )ijH f , 
where 0 sf F≤ ≤ . The noise power spectral density (PSD) that receiver n  experiences is denoted 
as ( )n fσ  and its transmit PSD as ( )nP f . Its transmit PSD is subject to its power constraint: 
( )
0
sF
nP f df ≤∫ nP .                  (2) 
For a fixed ( )nP f , if treating interference as noise, user n  can achieve the following data rate: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 20
log 1s
F n nn
n
n j jnj n
P f H f
R df
f P f H fσ ≠
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
∫ ∑ .          (3) 
In the power control games, the set of players is { }1, ,N= "N . The set nA  of actions available 
to user n  are the set of transmit PSDs satisfying the constraint in (2), and nu  is user n ’s 
achievable rate nR . To fully capture the performance tradeoff in the system, the rate region is 
defined as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }1 1, , : , , (2) (3)N NR R P f P f satisfying and= ∃" "R ,         (4) 
which contains all the achievable data rate combinations among the users subject to the power 
constraints.  
In the following subsections, we will investigate the power control games with homogeneous 
and heterogeneous users, and show that self-interested users can potentially improve the system 
performance if they have more knowledge. 
2) Power Control Game with Homogeneous Users 
Both non-cooperative and cooperative solutions have been developed for power control games. 
First, a non-cooperative iterative water-filling (IW) algorithm has been proposed to optimize the 
performance without the need for a central controller [10]. It assumes that each user only has the 
knowledge of its channel gain and the noise-and-interference PSD, i.e. ( ){ 2 ,privn nnk H f=  
( ) ( ) ( ) }2n j jnj nf P f H fσ ≠+∑ . At every decision stage, self-interested users deploying this 
algorithm try to myopically maximize their immediate achievable rates. Specifically, for a two-user 
system, each user simply updates their transmit PSD by choosing the optimal solutions of  
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
2
11 1
20
1 21 2
10
1
max ln 1
. .
0,
s
s
F
P f
F
H f P f
df
f H f P f
s t P f df
P f f
σ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠
≤
≥ ∀
∫
∫ 1P             (5) 
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and 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
2
2
22 2
20
2 12 1
20
2
max ln 1
. .
0,
s
s
F
P f
F
H f P f
df
f H f P f
s t P f df
P f f
σ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠
≤
≥ ∀
∫
∫ 2P .            (6) 
Both users will iteratively perform water-filling with respect to their experienced 
noise-and-interference PSD ( ) ( ) ( ) 2n j jnj nf P f H fσ ≠+∑  across the whole frequency band until a 
Nash equilibrium is reached.  
On the other hand, cooperative solutions in power control games can attain Pareto optimality by 
sharing their complete knowledge ( ){ } ( ){ }{ },comp ij nk H f fσ=  throughout the system and solving 
the optimization globally [11]. To find the Pareto optimal operating points on the boundary of the 
convex hull of the rate region R , the cooperative approaches focus on solving the weighted 
rate-sum maximization 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
2
2 20, , 1
0
max log 1
. .
0, ,
s
N
s
N F n nn
n
P f P f n n j jnj n
F
n
n
P f H f
w df
f P f H f
s t P f df n
P f n f
σ= ≠
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
≤ ∀
≥ ∀
∑ ∫ ∑
∫
"
nP ,        (7) 
in which the n th element in the weighted vector 1 Nw w⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦"w  indicates the relative importance 
of the user n ’s utility [11][12]. 
Figure 5 shows the achievable rate region for both approaches [12]. Similar with Figure 3, we 
can see that there is substantial performance gain obtained by the cooperative algorithms over the 
non-cooperative IW algorithm. However, all these algorithms still assume homogeneous 
participants in the sense that they deploy the same algorithms and have the similar information 
availability. Therefore, they are not well-suited to be applied in the scenarios where users differ in 
their ability to acquire information and improve performance.  
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Fig. 5. Rate regions obtained by various algorithms [12]. 
3) Heterogeneous Knowledge and Stackelberg Equilibrium 
To give an example of how users with heterogeneous knowledge can improve the system 
performance, we introduce a simple two-user two-channel power control game, where 
11 22 1H H= =  and 1 2 1σ σ= =  for both channels, ( )12 1 0.8H =  and ( ) ( ) ( )12 21 212 1 2H H H= =  
0.4= . Users’ power constraints are 10= =1 2P P . User 1 has two actions including Spread and 
Concentrate. In the Spread mode, user 1 will split its power in both channels. In the Concentrate 
mode, it will concentrate all its power in channel 1. User 2 has two similar actions, whereas it will 
transmit at its maximum power instead in channel 2 in the Concentrate mode. If users choose a 
(Concentrate, Spread) play, user 1’s utility will be 2
10log 1 2.12
1 0.4 * 5
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ + =⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠+  and user 2’s is 
( )2 2
5log 1 log 1 5
1 0.8 *10
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ + + +⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠+  3.22= . Similarly, we can calculate users’ utilities for all the 
action combinations and the payoff matrix of this game is shown in Figure 6. Note that in this game, 
user 1 has a strictly dominant strategy, Spread. Therefore, two players will end up with a (Spread, 
Spread) play if they have only the private knowledge and will always take the best response. The 
resulting outcome in this case will be ( )2.83, 2.42 . If user 1 is aware of user 2’s coupled reaction, it 
will play Concentrate instead, such that they will end up with a (Concentrate, Concentrate) play, 
which leads to an increased utility of ( )3.46, 3.46  for both players. It is worth noticing that 
additional knowledge is needed to attain this performance improvement, i.e. user 1 needs to know 
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the utility and the response strategy of the other user.  
User 1  User 2 Spread Concentrate 
Concentrate 2.12, 3.22 3.46, 3.46 
Spread 2.83, 2.42 3.59, 2.12 
 
Fig. 6. A simple power control game: user 1’s utility is given first in each cell, with user 2’s following. 
To address heterogeneity in the above case, we introduce the concept of Stackelberg equilibrium 
[2].  
Definition of Stackelberg Equilibrium: Let ( )nNE a  be the Nash equilibrium strategy of the 
remaining players if player n  chooses to play na . The strategy profile ( )( )* *,n na NE a  is a 
Stackelberg equilibrium for user n  iff 
( )( ) ( )( )* *, , ,n n n n n n n nu a NE a u a NE a a≥ ∀ ∈ A . 
4) Power Control Game with Heterogeneous Users 
In contrast with existing approaches, we study a power control game with two heterogeneous 
users [28]. Specifically, user 2 has only the knowledge ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 222 2 1 122 ,privk H f f P f H fσ= +  
and it always takes the best response strategy of water-filling. The knowledge of user 1 1heterk  
includes ( ){ }ijH f , ( ){ }k fσ , and user 2’s policy ( )2 2privkπ  of water-filling. We apply the concept of 
Stackelberg equilibrium to determine user 1’s optimal action by formulating the following bi-level 
programming problem: 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
2
2
11 1
20
1 21 2
10
1
2
22 2
2 20
2 21 1
2
max ln 1
. .
0
argmax ln 1
. .
s
s
s
F
P f
F
F
P f
upper level problem
lowe
H f P f
df
f H f P f
s t P f df
P f
H f
r level probl
P f
P f df
f H f P f
sm t P fe
σ
σ′
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠
≤
≥
⎛ ⎞′ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪
⎜ ⎠
⎪⎪⎩
+
′
⎪
⎝
∫
∫
∫
1P
( )20
0
sF P f df
≥
′ ≤∫ 2P
.   (8) 
 16
As indicated in (8), user 1 should optimize its transmit PSD by exploring its knowledge and 
including the opponent’s policy ( )2 2privkπ  as a constraint in the lower level problem in the bi-level 
program, whereas in the iterative water-filling algorithm, user 1 will solve the upper level problem 
instead since it only has the private knowledge. 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
2
4
6
8
frequency bins
P
1(
f)
IW Algorithm (User 1)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
2
4
6
8
frequency bins
P
1(
f)
Proposed Algorithm (User 1)
 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
2
4
6
8
frequency bins
P
2(
f)
IW Algorithm (User 2)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
2
4
6
8
frequency bins
P
2(
f)
Proposed Algorithm (User 2)
 
Fig. 7. Power allocations of different algorithms. 
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Fig. 8. Value of heterogeneous knowledge in power control game. 
We provide a sub-optimal solution of problem (8) to verify the performance improvement when 
having heterogeneous knowledge. Figure 7 shows the power allocations for both users using 
iterative water-filling algorithm and our proposed algorithm. In the iterative water-filling algorithm, 
each user water-fills the whole frequency band by regarding its competitor’s interference as 
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background noise. In contrast, user 1 will not water-fill, if it has additional knowledge 1heterk  of user 
2’s channel state information and power allocation strategy. As shown in Figure 7, user 1 
concentrates its power in the interval [ ]30,117  even though it can gain an immediate increase in 1R  
by re-allocating some of its power in the region where the noise PSD is below its water-level, e.g. 
[ ]20, 30  and [ ]117,140 . 
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Fig. 9. Histogram for the ratio of 1 1/ nashR R′  and 2 2/ nashR R′  
To evaluate the performance, we tested a variety of frequency-selective fading channels where 
the iterative water-filling algorithm reaches the Nash equilibrium. The total power of all rays of 
( )11H f  and ( )22H f  is normalized as one, and that of ( )12H f  and ( )21H f  is normalized as 0.5 . 
Figure 8 shows the achievable rate regions of different algorithms for one realization of randomly 
generated channels, which represent the values of various knowledge, including privk , heterk , and 
compk , in the two-user power control games with different combinations of power constraints. We 
can see the achievable rate region is enlarged in the case with heterogeneous users compared with 
the iterative water-filling solution. In other words, as illustrated in Figure 3, user 1’s additional 
knowledge can benefit both of them even though user 2 behaves in a non-collaborative manner. 
Figure 9 shows the simulated histogram of the ratio of 1 1/ nashR R′  and 2 2/ nashR R′ , where iR′  is user 
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i ’s achievable rate of our proposed algorithm in the heterogeneous case and nashiR  represents that 
of user i  if both of them adopt the water-filling algorithm. Simulation results show that both users 
will gain rate improvement in most of the realizations. The average rate improvement for user 1 is 
16.4%. Interestingly, the average rate improvement for user 2 is 74%, which is significantly higher 
than that of user 1.  
IV. STRATEGIC LEARNING IN COMMUNICATION GAMES 
In the previous section, we define the value of knowledge, which represents the achievable 
performance bound when heterogeneous users with different amounts of knowledge interact and 
reach steady-state. In this section, we will discuss how users can approach these bounds using 
strategic learning.  
A. Learning in Communication Games 
Most non-cooperative game theory research focuses on studying various equilibrium concepts. 
The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and 
introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, 
and the players’ payoff functions are all common knowledge. However, this is difficult to attain in 
communication networks, where the information is decentralized and often private to the users. 
Thus, we use another strand of game theory known as “learning in games” [29] in order to construct 
operational solutions that allow autonomous users to approach the performance bounds of 
knowledge that they try to obtain via strategic learning. In contrast with issues such as equilibrium 
characterization, the area of learning in games focuses on developing constructive methods to 
achieve various points in the utility space, where agents may or may not be person-by-person 
optimal. It also provides an alternative explanation of how equilibrium arises, as the long-run 
outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The 
main interest of strategic learning is to understand what will be the emergent behavior of interacting 
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agents that use simple adaptation rules to adjust and optimize their strategies. The outcome of these 
interactions need not converge to equilibrium, i.e., perpetual adaptation of strategies may persist, 
but the user’s and the system’s utilities may substantially improve compared to the performance of 
NE. While originally learning in games was used to develop descriptive models in social systems 
[47], these methods can also be used as a prescriptive model driving the design of dynamic 
reconfiguration mechanisms in multi-agent systems. This has motivated recently a growing interest 
in the application of strategic learning to engineered systems (e.g. in robotics [30]-[32] etc.). 
However, strategic learning algorithms have only been recently used in communication 
environments [33]-[41].  
In the previous section, we demonstrated the incentives of self-interested users to increase their 
knowledge. However, the process of acquiring the desired knowledge can be very difficult in 
general, because the intentions of users could be difficult to predict, and their knowledge and skills 
could be difficult to envisage. Thus, a strategic user can only predict these uncertainties caused by 
the competing users based on its explicit information exchanges with other users and its 
observations of past interaction. To address this challenge, a user can deploy strategic learning 
solutions to build beliefs based on their available information and, based on these beliefs, optimize 
their actions. Strategic learning algorithms have the following benefits when applied in multi-user 
communications settings. First, strategic learning can address the challenges arising due to the 
distributed availability of information and knowledge in communication networks, where the 
decisions on how to adapt the transmission strategies need to be performed in a distributed manner, 
as the delay caused by information exchanges and communication overheads usually do not allow 
propagating messages back and forth to a central decision maker. Second, as long as 
communication devices are built according to specific protocols, users’ behaviors, actions and even 
payoff functions, can be parameterized. As a result, users are able to easily model their opponents, 
and strategically learn the desired knowledge, thereby improving their performance through 
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repeated interactions. Third, if we consider dynamic environments, the operating conditions of 
interacting users are time-varying, and thus, they need to timely adapt to the network dynamics. In 
short, strategic learning is an appealing approach for driving the information acquisition and 
decision making in multi-user communication systems, where users need to optimize their 
transmission strategies in an informationally decentralized manner. 
The existing learning in games literature provides a broad spectrum of analytical and practical 
results on learning algorithms and underlying game structures for a variety of competitive 
interaction scenarios. In general, the main issue considered has been to characterize long term 
behavior in terms of a generalized equilibrium concept or characterize the lack of convergence for 
general classes of learning dynamics. However, when selecting learning solutions for 
communication games, the specific constraints and features of the considered multi-user 
interactions will need to be considered. For instance, the learning algorithm that should be deployed 
by a user in a wireless environment strongly depends on what information it can observe about the 
other users, given the adopted protocols or spectrum regulation rules. In this report, we assume that 
knowledge can be gathered by users based on observations and/or information. We differentiate 
these two types of knowledge gathering solutions, since we want to highlight the different 
communication overheads incurred as well as the challenges that arise when heterogeneous users, 
deploying different protocols and/or having different learning abilities interact.  
There are several different forms of information in communication systems: 
z Private information: this private information can include the utility forms, characteristics of 
the application traffic, channel gains or channel conditions (SINR, etc.); 
z Network information: the network information refers to the network resource states (e.g. 
which channels are available for transmission); 
z Opponents’ information: this information can include the protocols, action sets, strategies, 
and even utilities of the opponents.  
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B. Definition of Learning Algorithms and Beliefs in Communication Games 
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Fig. 10. An illustration of strategic learning 
We note that a learning algorithm is built based on all the observation tio  and exchanged 
information t iI−  obtained by user i , and hence, it is denoted as ( ),i i io I−L . Based on its available 
information and observations, a user can build its belief about other users’ strategies, policies, and 
the network resource, and update its response policy. As shown in Figure 10, in communication 
environment, a multi-agent strategic learning algorithm i i∈= ×L LN  can be defined using the 
following equations: 
( )ˆ ,t t ti i ia k withπ= ˆ i it t t t ti i wk s B B B− −⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦s π ,             (9) 
( )ˆ, , , ,t t t t tGame wΩ = N a u k ,              (10) 
( )t t ti io O∈= × = Ωo N ,                  (11) 
( )+1 ˆ,t t ti i ii kπ π= F ,                 (12) 
( )+1 , ,i i it t t ti iB B o I− − − −=π π πF , ( )+1 , ,t t t tw w w i iB B o I−= F , ( )+1 , ,i i it t t ti iB B o I− − − −=s s sF ,     (13) 
where tiπ  is the policy taken by user i  to select its action, tis  represents the status of user i ’s 
private information, 
i
tB −s , i
tB −π  and 
t
wB  are the beliefs about other users’ private information t is− , 
policies i−π  and network resource w , tˆik  approximates the true knowledge tik , and t iI−  is the 
explicit information that user i  has received about other users and the network resource; tΩ  is the 
output of the multi-user interaction;  tio  is the observation of user i  and O  is the observation 
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function, which depends on the current game output; 
i−πF , wF , and i−sF  are the update functions 
about the policies and beliefs. Note that different learning algorithms can employ various update 
functions, and the three update functions listed above are not necessarily included. 
Eq. (9) shows that user i  takes action based on its own private information, the belief about the 
other users’ private information, policies and available network resources. After each user 
determines its actions, a multi-user communication game is played and the results of the game are 
produced as shown in Eq. (10). The results of the multi-user game may or may not be fully observed 
by the users. Eq. (11) represents the observation function which depends on the implemented 
network protocols and sensing and measuring abilities of users. Hence, a user may have incentives 
to exchange information with other users. Eq. (12) shows that a user updates its policy based on its 
private information and beliefs. The exchanged information t iI−  may be used to update the belief 
about the other users’ states, policies and the network resource state. Eq. (13) represents the updates 
of these beliefs.  
( )t t ti i io u a= ( ), ,t t t t t ti i i i i iI a s u a a− − −= =
 
Fig. 11. Illustration of strategic learning solutions based on the required observation and information 
An important consideration in strategic learning solutions is the observation tio  and the 
information t iI−  available to each user as well as their ability to process this information. Figure 11 
highlights three conventional strategic learning solutions [29][42]: 1) Fictitious play: a wireless 
user’s strategy is the best response to the empirically observed actions of all other users ; 2) Regret 
matching: The user’s strategies are selected to eliminate the “regret” of not having played different 
actions based on retrospective observations of other user’s strategies; 3) Reinforcement learning: 
Playing a strategy increases or decreases the probability of it being played in the future, depending 
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on the utility received when playing that action.  
As shown in Figure 11, both regret matching and fictitious play require the information of the 
functional expression of utility ( ),t t ti i iu a a−  and assume that the actions t ia−  of other users can be 
observed or explicitly exchanged. Of course, this may not be feasible, especially for “large scale” 
games that involve many users, or when the other users adopt different protocols. In contrast, 
reinforcement learning only assumes knowledge of the received payoff by individual users of their 
own historical actions ( )t ti iu a , and it is easier to implement in wireless networks, where users with 
different protocols operate, and thus users cannot easily exchange information or interpret their 
opponents’ strategies based on their observations. Another difference among these learning 
methods is their required complexity, which is especially important if deployed by low-power 
wireless devices. Hence, depending on their available observation and information, strategic users 
can deploy different learning solutions to achieve various performance versus complexity 
trade-offs.  
If users deploy the same set of actions, strategies, and protocols, and are able to observe the other 
users’ actions, they can model the other users using “self-play” [47] and hence, they can easily 
develop strategies for efficiently sharing the network resources by anticipating the other users’ 
actions. However, if the heterogeneous users are not able to observe or interpret the other users’ 
actions (e.g. because they deploy different protocols), they may share the available network 
resources in a very inefficient manner, as previously discussed. Hence, users may decide that it is 
beneficial for them to exchange explicit information about their actions, and potentially even their 
strategies or utilities [40]. (Such information exchanges can be implemented using existing or new 
signaling protocols [1] at the application or MAC layer.) Therefore, users need to decide which 
strategic learning solution, information and observations have higher values for them. Next, we will 
discuss how users can quantify the value of learning, information, and observations. 
C. Value of Learning, Information, and Observations 
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As mentioned previously, the performance of a learning algorithm can be quantified based on the 
resulting payoffs obtained by users. We denote the policy generated by a learning algorithm L  as 
Lπ . Users will learn in order to improve their policies and payoffs from participating in the 
communication game. Given the available information and observations, the value of the learning 
algorithm L  is defined as the time average payoff obtained in a time window with length T  in 
which this learning algorithm was used: 
 ( ), ,
1
1
( , , , ) ( )
T
t
t
T
T =
= ∑ LLV o I so I s U π , (14) 
where the attainable payoff of the learning approach L  depends on the observation i io∈=×o N , 
private information i is∈=×s N , and exchanged information i iI∈ −=×I N . Thus, using this 
definition, the value of a learning scheme can be determined. As illustrated in Figure 12, different 
learning algorithms provide operational ways to approach the value of perfectly having the 
knowledge that the users are trying to learn. The “value of information/observations” for various 
available information and observations with respect to a learning algorithm L  can be also similarly 
computed, which will play a significant role on determining what information/observations should 
be exchanged/gathered by users.  
( )V privk
( )V heterk
( )V compk
( , , , )TLV o I s
 
Fig. 12. An illustration of the value of knowledge and learning. 
D. An Example: Regret Matching 
In this subsection, we introduce the concept of correlated equilibrium, which can be achieved 
using regret matching [42]. As an illustration, we also numerically show that users that employ this 
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strategic learning algorithm can improve their performance without any explicit information 
exchange with their competitors in the power control games.   
1) Correlated Equilibrium 
User 1 User 2 Aggress Backoff 
Aggress 0, 0 7, 2 
Backoff 2, 7 6, 6 
 
Fig. 13. Game in contention networks: user 1’s utility is given first in each cell, with user 2’s following. 
First, we consider the game in contention networks, e.g. networks deploying CSMA/CA based 
protocols, where two users are competing with each other in a packet transmission contest where 
each of them can either aggressively transmit or obey the backoff principle [17]. If one user is going 
to Aggress, it is better for the other to Backoff, otherwise the network will be congested and few 
packets can get through. But if one user chooses to Backoff, it is better for the other to Aggress, 
which will result in a better outcome than both users obeying the backoff principle. The payoff 
matrix is shown in Figure 13. There are three NE in this game, including two pure strategy NE, 
(Aggress, Backoff) and (Backoff, Aggress), and a mixed strategy NE where both Aggress with 
probability 1/3 and get an average utility of 4.67. 
Next, we introduce the concept of correlated equilibrium, which is a generalization of the NE 
concept. The correlated equilibrium is defined in a context where the players are able to access 
certain common signals. These signals allow players to coordinate their actions and to perform joint 
randomization over strategies. Given the recommended strategy, it is in the players’ best interests to 
conform with this strategy. The distribution of the strategies is called correlated equilibrium. 
Definition of Correlated Equilibrium: Let ( )Δ A  be the set of probability distributions on A . A 
probability distribution on the strategy profile ( )μ ∈ Δ A  is a correlated equilibrium (CE) of game 
Ω  if and only if, for all n ∈ N  and ( ),n na a− ∈ A , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,
n n n n
n n n n n n n n n n
a a
a a u a a a a u a aμ μ
− − − −
− − − −
∈ ∈
′≥∑ ∑
A A
 , for all n na ′ ∈ A  
A simple example of correlated equilibrium for the contention game is to let the two users choose 
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(Backoff, Backoff), (Aggress, Backoff), and (Backoff, Aggress) with identical probability of 1/3. 
Note the resulting utility for each user is 5, which is higher than that of the mixed strategy NE. For 
finite games, the set of CE is a non-empty polytope which contains the convex hull of all the NE. 
Figure 14 shows geometry of the equilibria of the 2-user contention game, where the tetrahedron is 
the simplex of probability distributions on outcomes of the game, the saddle is the set of 
distributions independent between players, the polytope with 5 vertices and 6 facets is the set of CE, 
and their three points of intersection are NE [43]. Importantly, as shown in Figure 14, since CE is a 
generalization of NE, a CE may lie outside the convex hull of the NE. Therefore, the performance 
of CE may be better than that of NE. 
 
Fig. 14. Geometry of CE and NE (A=Aggress, B=Backoff) [43]. 
2) Regret matching in Power Control Games 
To achieve the set of CE, a class of algorithms named regret matching was designed. The 
stationary solution of this algorithm exhibits no regret and users update their play probabilities in 
(9)-(13) are proportional to the “regrets” for not having played other actions [42]. In particular, for 
any two distinct actions tn na a′ ≠  in nA  and at every time t , the regret of user n  at time t  for not 
playing na ′  is  
( ) ( ) ( )1max 0, , ,t t t tn n n n n n n n
t t
r a u a a u a a
t
′ ′ ′− −
′≤
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪′ ′= −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑ .           (15) 
In other words, the regret for an action is defined as the increase in utility if such a change had 
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always been made in the past. Computing the regret completes the belief update part in the learning 
process in Figure 10. Users will update their policies by simply assigning the probability of 
selecting a certain transmission action proportionally to the regret of that action. It is shown that, if 
every player plays according to regret matching algorithm, the empirical distributions of play 
converge almost surely to the set of CE distributions of the game [42]. Specifically, in regret 
matching, the observation tio  in the past play serves the role of common signal that enables users to 
perform joint coordination. The advantage of the algorithm is that it requires no information 
exchange t iI−  among the users, and hence users can learn the correlated equilibrium in a fully 
distributed manner.  
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Fig. 15. Performance of regret matching in power control games. 
We applied this regret matching algorithm in a two-user power control game and the simulation 
results are shown in Figure 15. In the simulation, we discretize users’ action space by dividing their 
maximum power into multiple parts. Each user calculates the regrets for all the possible actions in 
its finite action space and updates its strategy repeatedly according to (15). The numerical results 
for different power constraints are shown in Figure 15. Because NE is only part of the set of CE, the 
best performance that regret matching can achieve is strictly better than that of NE achieved by the 
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IW algorithm. 
V. SOME CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Numerous challenges still need to be addressed to characterize the performance of the 
knowledge-driven games among heterogeneous users as well as to make these solutions widely 
adopted in practice. For example, the value of having different knowledge (e.g. the knowledge of 
other users’ action space, strategies, utility functions, the environment, etc.) needs to be quantified 
in various communication systems, and application-specific learning algorithms (e.g. which 
consider the available common knowledge about the protocols present in the system) need to be 
designed to achieve an increased utility efficiency instead of applying learning algorithms designed 
for generic games. Moreover, in each application scenario, the learning algorithms need to be 
benchmarked along the following three dimensions: (i) incurred communication overhead for the 
information exchanges, (ii) incurred computational overhead, and (iii) the achievable utility that 
can be derived by different learning algorithms (i.e. the value of learning). 
Another interesting topic is to investigate the scenarios in which users only have the 
(probabilistic) belief about the other players’ characteristics. In these cases, Bayesian games are an 
appealing approach to model the interaction and determine the achievable performance [26].  
Considering the dynamic nature of the wireless networks where users’ CSI and source 
characteristics are dynamically changing over time, all the previously addressed issues will be 
further complicated. More advanced multi-user interaction models, e.g. stochastic games, are 
required to cope with these dynamics in the multi-user interaction [41].  
Research advances will also need to be made to allow users to proactively improve the available 
common knowledge based on which the multi-user interact, and design protocols that can 
encourage the accumulation of common knowledge, which can increase the system performance 
and even prevent malicious users to misbehave. 
Summarizing, in this report, we have provided a fresh glimpse of how heterogeneous knowledge 
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and strategic learning can change the conventional way people have designed and characterized the 
multi-user interactions in wireless communication systems. Considering the complexity of this 
research topic and the diversity of existing literature, our presentation is far from comprehensive. 
However, we hope that this report can motivate the need for further research activities in studying 
the knowledge-driven interaction of users in communication networks. Finally, it is our vision that 
designing communication systems, where users with different amounts of knowledge can compete 
according to “free market” principles rather than based on guidelines imposed by resource owners 
and protocol providers, will lead to unprecedented performance improvements for communication 
devices and systems as well as catalyze new algorithm and system designs.  
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